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Security Police

THE PEACEKEEPER

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90th Security Police Group
F. E. Warren AFB, WY
1 September 1985

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FOREWARD

The Security Police at Francis E Warren AFB have an enormous responsibility. We must provide security against all threats for a missile complex that extends over three states. We also must maintain constant vigilance over priority resources which are secured in the Weapons Storage Area. Finally, Security Police are tasked to protect base personnel in such a manner as to ensure their capability to perform the duties needed for all of us to fulfill our mission. For us to accomplish such a vast and imperative calling, we must continuously train and evaluate ourselves. This job knowledge book is published for you--to assist you in maintaining the job proficiency, professionalism, and pride which you put into the work you perform.

STEVEN J. SAFFORD, Lt Col, USAF
Commander, 90th Security Police Group

ROBERT A. SIEMNICK, MSgt, USAF
Superintendent, Training Branch



Creed of A Security Policeman

I am a security policeman. I hold allegiance to my country, devotion to duty, and personal integrity above all. I wear my badge of authority with dignity and restraint, and promote by example high standards of conduct, appearance, courtesy, and performance. I seek no favor because of my position. I perform my duties in a firm, courteous, and impartial manner, irrespective of a person's color, race, religion, national origin, or sex. I strive to merit the respect of my fellow airmen and all with whom I come in contact.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Francis E Warren AFB WY 82005-5000

F E WARREN AFB PAMPHLET 125-6
1 September 1985

Security Police

THE PEACEKEEPER

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GENERAL KNOWLEDGE



SECTION A - RESPONSIBILITIES/MISSION

1-1. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND. According to AFP 50-34, Volume I, SAC "organizes, trains, equips, administers, and prepares strategic forces for aerospace combat, including offensive strikes, reconnaissance, and special missions."

1-2. MISSION OF THE 90TH SECURITY POLICE GROUP (90 SPG). The mission of the 90 SPG is to conduct security operations and maintain notification procedures to protect the wing's warmaking capability; to deter clandestine and overt threats against priority resources and facilities associated with the 200 Minuteman missiles assigned to the wing; and to protect the safety, well-being, and quality of life of base personnel.

1-3. CHAIN OF COMMAND:

a. Commander in Chief . . . . . _____

b. Secretary of Defense . . . . . _____

c. Secretary of the Air Force . . . . . _____

d. Chief of Staff, USAF . . . . . _____

e. Commander in Chief, SAC . . . . . _____

f. Commander, 15 AF . . . . . _____

g. Commander, 4 AD . . . . . _____

h. Commander, 90 SMW . . . . . _____

i. Commander, 90 SPG . . . . . _____

1-4. SECURITY POLICE GENERAL ORDERS:

a. I will take charge of my post and protect personnel and property for which I am responsible until properly relieved.

b. I will report all violations of orders I am instructed to enforce.

c. I will give the alarm in case of disorder or emergency.

1-5. 90TH SECURITY POLICE GROUP ORGANIZATION:

88th MISSILE SUPPORT SQUADRON: Is tasked with the responsibility of supporting the 89 & 90 MSS in the security of the missile complex.

89th MISSILE SECURITY SQUADRON: Is tasked with the security of missiles in the 320 SMS and in the 321 SMS.

90th MISSILE SECURITY SQUADRON: Is tasked with the security of missiles in the 319 SMS and in the 400 SMS.

90th SECURITY POLICE SQUADRON: Is broken down into two different areas of security. Personnel assigned to the Weapons Storage Area are charged with the security of warheads and components while in storage. Law Enforcement personnel provide security to all personnel on base, all funded activities, and personnel residing on base.

SECTION B - GENERAL TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

1-6. HELPING HAND REPORT. An unclassified telephone message sent rapidly up the chain of command to inform higher headquarters that a possible hostile event has been detected at the base or a dispersed site, which could affect the ready general war capability.

1-7. COVERED WAGON REPORT. An unclassified telephone message sent up the chain of command to inform that a condition exists or an event has occurred at a base in connection with priority resources as a result of actual or probable hostile action.

1-8. SAFE WIND. A down-channel alerting order indicating an increased threat level, implementing an appropriate security response option (SRO) as directed by 90 SPG/CC.

1-9. NUC FLASH. A nuclear accident that could result in the possibility of a war.

1-10. POSITIVE DURESS. The actual passing and receiving of the current duress word.

1-11. PASSIVE DURESS. Can be initiated by noncompliance with standard procedures.

1-12. AFR 190-1. Governs the release of information during military accidents.

1-13. AFR 125-26. Governs the use of force and deadly force.

1-14. PRIORITY "A". Applies to weapons systems in alert status for direct enemy engagement as well as components of tactical command/control warning facilities and communications elements essential for alert force employment and all nuclear weapons in Air Force custody.

1-15. PRIORITY "B". Pertains to aircraft and missiles in their launch areas or home base without warheads (down-loaded).

1-16. PRIORITY "C". Applies to combat aircraft and missiles that cannot be considered as in-place forces by virtue of their present locations.

1-17. NO-LONE ZONE. Those designated areas containing critical components where the presence of a lone individual is prohibited.

1-18. RESTRICTED AREA. A legally established military area under Air Force jurisdiction into which persons may not enter without specific authority.

1-19. ACCESS. Close physical proximity to a nuclear weapon/critical component of a nuclear weapon system in such a manner as to allow the opportunity to tamper with or damage the nuclear weapon or critical component. A person does not have access when in the physical proximity of a nuclear weapon/critical component if under proper escort.

1-20. DEFCON V. Code name "FADE OUT."

1-21. DEFCON IV. Code name "DOUBLE TAKE."

1-22. DEFCON III. Code name "ROUND HOUSE."

1-23. DEFCON II. Code name "FAST PACE."

1-24. DEFCON I. Code name "COCKED PISTOL."

1-25. ORI. An operational readiness inspection.

1-26. WSE. A wing security evaluation.

1-27. SRO. A security response option.

1-28. NDA. A nuclear defense area.

1-29. PRP. The Personnel Reliability Program.

1-30. ART. An alarm response team.

1-31. SRT. A security response team.

1-32. FT. A fire team.

1-33. BF. A backup force.

1-34. AF. An augmentation force.

1-35. RF. A response force.

1-36. WCP. The Wing Command Post.

1-37. WSC. Wing Security Control.

1-38. EAL. An entry authority list.

1-39. 3901 SMES. 3901st Strategic Maintenance Evaluation Squadron.

1-40. THREATCON WHITE. A nonspecific threat of terrorism against US military personnel or facilities in a general geographic area.

1-41. THREATCON YELLOW. A specific threat of terrorism against US military personnel or facilities within a particular geographic area.

1-42. THREATCON RED. An imminent threat of terrorist acts against specific US military personnel or facilities.

1-43. SRO #1. Defensive reaction.

1-44. SRO #2. Advanced readiness.

1-45. SRO #3. Security vigilance.

1-46. SRO #4. Normal security operations.

NOTE: Threatcons and SROs are implemented simultaneously. The threatcon level will usually directly correspond to the SRO level. (Example: when Threatcon Red is implemented, SRO #2 or #1 will normally be implemented as well.)

1-47. PHONETICS:

ALPHABET		NUMERALS	
A Alpha	AL FAH	0 ZERO	ZERO
B Bravo	BRAH VOH	1 ONE	WUN
C Charlie	CHAR LEE	2 TWO	TOO
D Delta	DELL TAH	3 THREE	TREE
E Echo	ECH OH	4 FOUR	FOW-ER
F Foxtrot	FOKS TROT	5 FIVE	FIFE
G Golf	GOLF	6 SIX	SIX
H Hotel	HOH TELL	7 SEVEN	SEV-EN
I India	IN DEE AH	8 EIGHT	AIT
J Juliet	JEW LEE ETT	9 NINE	NIN-ER
K Kilo	KEY LOH		
L Lima	LEE MAH		
M Mike	MIKE		
N November	NO VEM BER		
O Oscar	OSS CAH		
P Papa	PAH PAH		
Q Quebec	KEH BECK		
R Romeo	ROW ME OH		
S Sierra	SEA AIR RAH		
T Tango	TANG GO		
U Uniform	YOU NEE FORM		
V Victor	VIK TAH		
W Whiskey	WISS KEY		
Y Yankee	YANG KEE		
Z Zulu	ZOO LOO		

SECTION C – RESPONSIBILITIES OF A NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER (NCO)

1-48. AIR FORCE POLICY. AFP 39-6, The Enlisted Force Organization, states AF policy on the responsibilities of NCOs and provides guidance concerning such responsibilities assigned to airmen in grades sergeant through chief master sergeant, and to all commissioned officers charged with management of military personnel.

a. An NCO is an airman with the rank of chief master sergeant, senior master sergeant, master sergeant, technical sergeant, staff sergeant, or sergeant.

b. The role of an NCO is to carry out the orders of those appointed above him or her by effectively utilizing people, equipment, and other resources assigned to him or her. NCOs represent the Air Force to airmen of lesser grade and the civilian community; therefore, their personal integrity, loyalty, and devotion to duty should be above reproach at all times. As an Air Force leader, he or she upholds its policies and traditions and promotes the Air Force as a career and way of life.

1-49. NCO RANK AND AUTHORITY:

a. NCOs take rank and precedence according to grade, time within grade (according to their dates of rank), or as specified in AFR 35-54, Rank, Precedence, and Command. Responsibility and the necessity for aggressive personal initiative increase progressively as the individual advances within the NCO structure. Within each grade, responsibility for leading rests upon the ranking individual. This policy stems from time-honored military customs and traditions and does not, in any way, detract from the nature of other NCOs or airmen nor lessen their responsibility for exemplary conduct and performance as leaders.

b. NCOs are delegated the authority and responsibility necessary to exercise leadership corresponding with grade attained, and are given advantages and privileges commensurate with their responsibilities. They should not be assigned duties or details that will compromise their positions as leaders.

SECTION D - PUNITIVE ARTICLES - UCMJ

1-50. ARTICLES/CHARGES:

77 . . . . . Principles
78 . . . . . Accessory after the fact
79 . . . . . Lesser included offenses
80 . . . . . Attempts
81 . . . . . Conspiracy
82 . . . . . Solicitation
83 . . . . . Fraudulent enlistment, appointment, separation
84 . . . . . Effecting unlawful enlistment, appointment, separation
85 . . . . . Desertion
86 . . . . . Absence without leave
87 . . . . . Missing a movement
88 . . . . . Contempt towards officials
89 . . . . . Disrespect towards a superior officer
90 . . . . . Striking, assaulting, disobeying a superior officer
91 . . . . . Insubordination to a warrant officer or NCO
92 . . . . . Failure to obey a lawful order or regulation
93 . . . . . Cruelty, maltreatment
94 . . . . . Mutiny, sedition
95 . . . . . Resisting apprehension
96 . . . . . Releasing a prisoner without authority
97 . . . . . Unlawful detention
98 . . . . . Unnecessary delay in disposing of a case
99 . . . . . Misbehavior before the enemy
100 . . . . . Subordinate compelling surrender, striking the colors
101 . . . . . Improper use of codes and countersigns
102 . . . . . Forcing a safeguard
103 . . . . . Looting and pillaging
104 . . . . . Aiding the enemy
105 . . . . . Maltreating prisoners
106 . . . . . Spying
107 . . . . . False official statements
108 . . . . . Misappropriation of military property
109 . . . . . Misappropriation of private property
110 . . . . . Improperly hazarding a vessel
111 . . . . . Drunk or reckless driving
112 . . . . . Drunk on duty
113 . . . . . Misbehavior of a sentinel
114 . . . . . Dueling
115 . . . . . Malingering
116 . . . . . Riot or breach of peace
117 . . . . . Provocative speech or gestures
118 . . . . . Murder
119 . . . . . Rape or carnal knowledge
120 . . . . . Manslaughter
121 . . . . . Larceny
122 . . . . . Robbery
123 . . . . . Forgery
124 . . . . . Maiming
125 . . . . . Sodomy
126 . . . . . Arson
127 . . . . . Extortion
128 . . . . . Assault
129 . . . . . Burglary
130 . . . . . Housebreaking
131 . . . . . Perjury
132 . . . . . False Claims
133 . . . . . Conduct unbecoming an officer
134 . . . . . General article - any action which might tend to bring disgrace upon the military

SECTION E - NUCLEAR SURETY KNOWLEDGE

1-51. PURPOSE. The purpose of the Nuclear Surety Program is to prevent inadvertent, accidental, or unauthorized nuclear detonations or launch of a nuclear weapons system; to minimize both the number and consequences of nuclear accidents and incidents; and to ensure adequate security for nuclear weapons/weapons systems.

1-52. WEAPONS SYSTEM SAFETY RULES. AFR 122-23 contains the weapons system safety rules for the Minuteman III weapon system.

1-53. PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRAM (PRP). The PRP is governed by AFR 35-99, Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program, and is designed to make sure that each person who performs duties with nuclear weapons or weapons systems and critical components meets the highest possible standards of individual reliability.

1-54. THE TWO POSITIONS UNDER PRP:

a. Critical - Those personnel requiring direct access and having the technical expertise required to arm or launch a nuclear weapon/weapons systems.

b. Controlled - A position in which the individual's duties require access or the individual controls access to a close-in security area, but in which the individual has no technical knowledge of the nuclear resource.

1-55. TYPES OF DECERTIFICATION UNDER PRP:

a. Suspension - Action to relieve a member from PRP-related duties immediately, without formal decertification. Does not exceed 45 days.

b. Temporary - Formal action taken in a situation when, in the commander's judgment, more time is required for evaluation or when the situation is serious enough to warrant formal action. Does not exceed 180 days unless major command grants an extension.

c. Permanent - Formal action that is taken for a situation that cannot be resolved in the near future.

1-56. HOW A MEMBER IS CERTIFIED UNDER PRP: CRPO sends AF Form 186, Personnel Reliability Certificate, to the hospital; the hospital reviews individual's medical records and annotates and sends the AF Form 186 to the unit commander; the unit commander interviews the individual and signs the AF Form 186.

1-57. WHO MONITORS PERSONNEL UNDER PRP:

a. The individuals monitor themselves.

b. An individual's peers and supervisor also monitor the individual.

1-58. TWO-MAN CONCEPT. A minimum of two authorized persons, each capable of detecting an incorrect procedure or unauthorized act involving critical components on the part of the other member and each familiar with applicable safety and security requirements, will be present during any operation affording access to a no-lone zone.

1-59. WHO MAKES UP A SUITABLE TWO MAN TEAM. Any two authorized personnel certified under the PRP program, possessing at least a secret clearance, and authorized by a competent authority make up a suitable team. These two personnel may consist of:

a. Two military.

b. Two Department of the Air Force civilians.

c. Two certified contractors.

d. Any combination of the above.

1-60. ENFORCEMENT. Responsibility for enforcement of the SAC Two-Man Policy rests with each individual directly or indirectly involved with any operation involving a nuclear weapon, nuclear weapons system, or critical component of a nuclear weapons system.

1-61. DOD SAFETY STANDARDS:

a. Prevent weapons involved accident or incidents or jettisoned weapons from producing a nuclear yield.

b. Prevent deliberate arming, launching, firing, or releasing except upon execution of emergency war orders or when directed by competent authority.

c. Prevent inadvertent arming, launching, firing, or releasing.

d. Ensure adequate security.

1-67. WHAT CONSTITUTES A NUC FLASH:

a. Detonation of a nuclear weapon.

b. Launch of a nuclear armed or nuclear capable missile.

c. Unauthorized flight or unauthorized deviation from an approved flight plan by a nuclear armed or nu
capable aircraft.

NOTE: Any of the above factors constituting a Nuc Flash could create the risk of war.

1-63. WHAT CONSTITUTES A BROKEN ARROW (NUCLEAR ACCIDENT):

a. Nuclear detonation of a weapon.

b. Nonnuclear detonation or burning of a weapon.

c. Loss, theft, seizure, or destruction of a weapon, warhead, or nuclear component.

d. Radioactive contamination.

e. Public hazard (actual or implied).

1-64. WHAT CONSTITUTES A BENT SPEAR (NUCLEAR INCIDENT):

a. Damage to a nuclear weapon or component to the extent that major rework, complete replacement, reas
tion, or recertification by the design agency is required.

b. A situation which requires immediate action for safety or nuclear weapons security, or which may re
in adverse public reaction or premature release of information.

c. A situation which has such potential consequence as to warrant the interest or action of official
agencies outside the Air Force.

1-65. WHAT CONSTITUTES A DULL SWORD (NUCLEAR SAFETY DEFICIENCY):

a. Damage, malfunction, or failure of a weapon or warhead.

b. Exposure of a weapon or warhead to an unusual or severe environment.

c. Inadvertent release, launch, loss, or destruction of a nuclear training weapon or ballast dummy weap

d. Actual or suspected loss or compromise of codes, code material, software, or hardware designate
critical components according AFR 122-4, the Two-Man Concept.

e. Safety-related design deficiency, malfunction, or failure of any piece of nuclear safety certi
equipment.

f. Violation of the nuclear safety certification restrictions or exceeding of the nuclear safety lim
tions on nuclear certified equipment.

g. Damage, malfunction, or failure of nuclear weapon-associated equipment such as test, handling,
ground support equipment and combat delivery vehicle suspension release, launch, separation, arming, monitor
and control systems.

h. Deficiency or failure involving nuclear safety-certified computer software.

i. Unauthorized tampering, attempted break-in, or other unusual security related events at nuclear we
operational or storage facilities.

j. Security deficiency observed during logistic movement.

k. Procedural violations where nuclear surety can be enhanced.

l. Any problems or situations which may affect nuclear safety or which have not been solved through o
reporting directives. This category is based on the judgment of the commander.

SECTION F - DISASTER PREPAREDNESS

1-66. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS:

a. Broken Arrow - An unexpected event involving nuclear weapons or weapon components and resulting in a non-nuclear detonation.

b. Bent Spear - A nuclear incident involving a nuclear warhead that results in damage, malfunction, or failure of the nuclear weapon (which the Air Force can fix).

c. Dull Sword - A nuclear safety deficiency, a situation in which a nuclear weapon could be degraded because of damage, or malfunction or failure of the nuclear weapon (which the Air Force can fix).

d. Entry control point - A specific area or place established on the control zone (2,000 foot cordon) perimeter, where entry into the control zone is monitored.

e. Ground Zero - The point of impact at the disaster location.

1-67. SECURITY POLICE RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. The Security Police have the responsibility for manning the 2,000 foot cordon during Broken Arrows. Law Enforcement personnel are primarily responsible for evacuation of persons from the danger area. All military personnel respond and assist with Broken Arrows as deemed necessary.

b. Security Police responding to the scene of a Broken Arrow perform duties as either a sector supervisor or as a cordon sentry. Specific instructions associated with these duties are located in the SSIs, however, some of your basic instructions are as follows. Sector supervisors should brief cordon sentries on the location of the accident scene, locations of entry control points, the sentries' location with respect to Ground Zero, and how to properly don the gas mask. All sector supervisors will be knowledgeable of grid map plotting procedures. To effectively plot grid coordinates, keep this general rule in mind: Read all maps right and up. Given the coordinates 4.2/E.7, you can determine the crash site indicated in the illustration in figure 1-1 below. Cordon sentries should ensure that they have all required equipment prior to posting (for instance, flashlight, hard hat, gloves, reflective vest, gas mask, and SSIs).



Figure 1-1. Grid Map Illustration.

c. The following personnel are exempt from being stopped or diverted during disaster prepared exercises: civilian contractors (for example, vending machine suppliers) emergency vehicles on an ac emergency run, and Exercise Evaluation Team (EET) members identified by armbands or badges with "EET."

d. All personnel should know the exercise smoke colors:

(1) WHITE. . . . . Ground Zero impact point

(2) RED . . . . . Weapon is on fire, is emulfed in flames or has detonated

(3) GREEN . . . . . Biological or chemical agents

(4) PURPLE . . . . . Terrorist activities or location

e. All personnel should know the siren warning signals. (See figure 1-2 below.)

USAF STANDARDIZED ALARM SIGNALS
FOR THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

WARNING OR CONDITION	SIGNAL	MEANING	REQUIRED ACTIONS
ATTACK WARNING	3-5 MINUTE WAVERING TONE ON SIREN OR OTHER DEVICES 3-5 MINUTE PERIOD OF SHORT BLASTS FROM HORNS, WHISTLES AND OTHER DEVICES	ATTACK IS IMMINENT	PROCEED IMMEDIATELY TO DESIGNATED SHELTER OR TAKE OTHER APPROPRIATE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS
PEACETIME EMERGENCY WARNING	3-5 MINUTE STEADY TONE ON SIREN OR OTHER DEVICES	PEACETIME DISASTER THREAT EXISTS	BE PREPARED TO TAKE IMMEDIATE SHELTER OR OTHER APPROPRIATE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS TUNE INTO LOCAL RADIO AND TELEVISION STATIONS FOR EMERGENCY INFORMATION LISTEN TO PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEMS FOR ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS
ALL CLEAR	DECLARED VERBALLY BY LOCAL OFFICIAL AGENCIES THROUGH LOCAL RADIO, TELEVISION, PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEMS, ETC	THREAT CONDITION TERMINATED	RESUME NORMAL OPERATIONS OR INITIATE RECOVERY IF APPLICABLE

CHECK LOCAL PROCEDURES FOR VARIATIONS

Distribution: F

AFR 355-1
20 July 1984

Figure 1-2. Disaster Preparedness Warning Signals.

1-69. M-17/M17A-1 PROTECTIVE MASK. The protective mask is an important item for all personnel during any disaster situation (see figures 1-3 and 1-4, page 11). The following information will aid you in utilizing your protective mask:

a. Cleaning - Flush external parts with warm soapy water and rinse with clear water.

b. Proper donning - Loosen all straps and place both thumbs on the inside of the lower straps and pull outward. Place your chin into the lower portion of the mask and pull the straps over your head.

c. Purging the mask - Place palms over the bottom of the voicemitter and blow hard. To check the mask for leaks, place palms over the air inlets and inhale.

d. All security personnel will wear the protective mask as indicated. Remember that the protective mask cannot be used in confined spaces where the oxygen content is below 18 percent of the atmosphere.



Figure 1-3. Positioning of Mask Inside Carrier.

Figure 1-4. Wearing the Gas Mask.

SECTION G - RELEASE OF INFORMATION DURING MILITARY ACCIDENTS

1-69. POLICY. It is Air Force policy to assist the news media in every possible way during an accident, as long as the assistance is consistent with national security.

1-70. ON-BASE ACCIDENTS. If an accident occurs on base, you will not have to be concerned about news media, because on SAC bases all newsmen are escorted by a Public Affairs representative.

1-71. OFF-BASE ACCIDENTS:

a. It is against federal regulations for newsmen to take pictures, make sketches, or otherwise describe classified information.

b. The on-scene commander (senior AF representative) will determine if classified material is exposed. If none is exposed, then photographs will be allowed.

c. If any classified material is exposed, it must be covered or removed before photographs can be permitted.

d. If pictures are taken of classified material, the film must be confiscated by civil law enforcement officials (the film will be developed by an Air Force photo lab and any unclassified negatives will be returned).

e. You, as a Security Policeman, should never make statements about the accident to the news media. Refer inquiries to the Public Affairs representative.

NOTE: If nuclear material is involved, ensure that Broken Arrow procedures are initiated.

SECTION H - DURESS CODE USE AND PREPARATION

1-72. DURESS CODE USE. A duress code is a word or phrase which can be injected into normal conversation when an authorized individual is forced by an unauthorized individual to assist in illegal actions. It is used to alert command and control or other responsible agencies/individuals that the user is under duress and may be forced to assist in an act that is detrimental to the weapons systems.

1-73. POSITIVE DURESS CODE USE. A positive duress requires the actual passing and receipt of the current primary duress word or phrase. There is no other method of indicating a positive duress in the Minuteman weapons system. Each positive duress indication is reported as a Helping Hand.

1-74. PASSIVE DURESS IDENTIFICATION USE. It is conceivable that instances will occur where the individual placed under duress cannot pass the positive duress code to get assistance. Passive duress may be indicated by noncompliance with established procedures; for example, failure to report as prescribed, reporting incorrectly, using a bogus or reversed call sign. Helping Hand reports are automatically declared for passive duress indications from nuclear weapon convoys and two-officer courier teams in the missile field.

1-75. EXERCISE DURESS CODE USE. In addition to the primary and alternate duress word or phrase, the Chief, Security Police, also publishes an exercise duress word. This code is used during tests of the security reaction system by local Security Police Quality Control, IG Teams, and any other official inspection function. It is not necessary to change the exercise duress word periodically.

1-76. PREPARATION. The Chief, Security Police, prepares and distributes a duress code list for use by all personnel employed in or dispatched to the missile field; this includes local exempt mission. The word or phrase is selected so that it may be injected in a normal conversation.

a. Codes are changed every six months or when compromised, whichever is sooner.

b. To prevent compromise, the duress code list is strictly controlled and designated "For Official Use Only."

SECTION I - SIGN AND COUNTERSIGN

1-77. SIGN/COUNTERSIGN LIST. The Chief, Security Police (CSP), must publish a sign/countersign list to be used by all mission category I and II dispatches and Status Authentication System (SAS) document transporting teams. These procedures are applicable both on the strategic missile support base (SMSB) and in the missile complex. The sign/countersign will be a numerical system using a two digit number as the sign, and a different two digit number as the countersign. (EXAMPLE: The sign is 36, the countersign is 12). The sign/countersign list must be changed monthly or when it is compromised. The sign/countersign is designated "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY," but is strictly controlled to prevent compromise. This list will have both a primary and an alternate sign/countersign.

1-78. PASSIVE DURESS. When a passive duress is declared for a mission category I or II team or an SAS document transporting team, the ART must respond and locate the team. When the ART has located the team, they will contact the team chief and request the sign. The ART will respond with the countersign, even if the team chief passes or gives the incorrect sign. This will allow the ART to be properly identified to the team chief. After the two teams have identified themselves by the above-mentioned procedures, the ART will determine the reason for the passive duress from the team.

a. If a discrepancy is found in the identification of personnel, the ART will escort the team to the nearest LCF and the appropriate agency will be contacted for proper identification.

b. The SAS team will not be disarmed or separated from the material they are escorting unless the team cannot be identified or unless it is apparent that the team is under duress.

WEAPONS

SECTION A - USE OF FORCE/DEADLY FORCE

2-1. USE FORCE TO DISCHARGE ASSIGNED DUTIES (ONLY WHEN FORCE IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY):

a. The degree of force used must be the minimum necessary to accomplish the duty involved. The application of an excessive amount of force is detrimental to the maintenance of law and order and may subject the individual who applies it to disciplinary action.

b. The minimum force necessary may include physical apprehension and restraint techniques, chemical dispersers, batons, or military working dogs, all of which result in an application less than deadly force.

2-2. DEADLY FORCE (USED ONLY IN THE FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES/INSTANCES):

a. To protect personnel from loss of life or serious bodily harm.

b. To protect the life of another, or to prevent the commission of a serious offense involving violence and threatening death or serious bodily harm such as arson, armed robbery, aggravated assault, or rape.

c. To remove the threat of theft, destruction of property designated by an installation commander, espionage aimed at property or information designated by an installation commander or other competent authority as vital to national security.

d. To prevent the actual theft or destruction of property designated by an installation commander or other competent authority which, although not vital to the national security, is of substantial importance to the national security. Falling within the provisions of this instruction is property specifically designated as having substantial importance to the national security under the base Resource Protection Program.

e. To prevent the actual theft of property which is inherently dangerous to others (for example, property which, in the hands of an unauthorized person, presents a potential hazard of death or serious bodily harm to others). This includes weapons, ammunition, explosives, and chemicals.

f. To apprehend or prevent the escape of a person whose presence is unauthorized in the vicinity of property or information which is vital to the national security and/or who has presented an actual threat of theft, sabotage, or espionage.

g. To apprehend or prevent the escape of a person reasonably believed to have committed an act of a nature specified above.

h. To apprehend or prevent the escape of a prisoner whose escape has been determined by the corrections officer or installation commander to create a threat of death or serious bodily harm to others.

i. When directed by the lawful order of a superior official governed by AFR 125-26, Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel.

SECTION B - BASIC SMALL ARMS USED BY SECURITY POLICE

2-3. M-16 RIFLE DATA:

a. Description - The M-16 is a 5.56mm (.223 caliber), magazine-fed, gas-operated, air-cooled shoulder weapon, which can be fired either semi-automatically or automatically. (See figure 2-1, page 16.)

b. Maximum range - 2,653 meters.

c. Maximum effective range - 460 meters.

d. Safety Device - One safety lever switch also acts as the selector for semi-automatic or automatic fire. The weapon is on "SAFE" position when the indicator marker is pointing towards the muzzle of the weapon. The weapon must be cocked prior to placing the weapon on "SAFE."

e. Three major groups of the M-16 rifle are:

(1) Upper receiver group.

(2) Lower receiver group.

(3) Bolt carrier group.

2-4. M-60 MACHINEGUN DATA:

a. Description - The M-60 is a 7.62mm air-cooled, belt-fed, gas-operated automatic weapon, fired from the "open-bolt" position. (See figures 2-2 and 2-3, pages 17 and 18.)

b. Maximum range - 3,725 meters.

c. Maximum effective range - 1,100 meters.

d. Safety device - The safety device is located on the left side of the trigger housing area and is on "SAFE" when the indicator is pointing towards the ground.

e. Six major groups of the M-60 machinegun are:

(1) Stock group.

(2) Buffer group.

(3) Operating group.

(4) Trigger-housing group.

(5) Barrel group.

(6) Upper receiver group.

f. Roles of the M-60 - The machinegunner supports the rifleman in both the attack phase and the defense phase. The machinegun is capable of engaging the enemy at a great distance with a heavy volume of firepower. The many and varied uses of the M-60 are only limited by the experience and knowledge of the gunner himself.

2-5. .38 CALIBER REVOLVER DATA:

a. Description - The Smith & Wesson Combat Masterpiece .38 caliber revolver is a six shot, breech-loaded, hand-held weapon. It has a solid frame, a wing-out cylinder with six chambers, and a manual ejector. The cylinder is mounted on a yoke assembled to the front frame and swings out when released by the thumb piece. The cylinder is unloaded when pressure is applied on the extractor which passes down the central axis of the cylinder. The revolver may be fired either single action or double action. Cocking the hammer by either method causes the cylinder to rotate and align the next chamber with the barrel. (See figure 2-4, page 19.)

b. Maximum range - 1800 yards.

c. Maximum effective range - 50 to 75 yards.

d. Safety device - internal (cylinder stop and hammer block).

e. Two major groups of the .38 revolver are:

(1) Frame group.

(2) Cylinder and yoke group.

2-6. M-203 GRENADE LAUNCHER DATA:

a. Description - The M-203 Grenade Launcher is single shot, breech-loaded, air-cooled weapon designed for use with the M-16 rifle. (See figure 2-5, page 19.)

b. Maximum range - 400 meters.

c. Maximum effective range:

(1) Area target - 350 meters.

(2) Point target - 150 meters.

d. Safety device - The safety is just forward of the trigger, inside the trigger guard. To place the launcher on "SAFE," the safety must be in the most rearward position.

e. Three major groups of the M-203 grenade launcher are:

(1) Handguard and sight assembly group.

(2) Barrel assembly.

(3) Receiver assembly.



M16 Rifle, Right Side View

1. Stock
2. Charging Handle
3. Rear Sight Windage Drum
4. Carrying Handle
5. Hand Guard Slip Ring
6. Hand Guard
7. Front Sight Assembly
8. Flash Suppressor
9. Bayonet
10. Bayonet Lug
11. Upper Sling Swivel
12. Sling
13. Ejection Port Cover
14. Magazine
15. Magazine Release
16. Walter Finger Guard
17. Trigger
18. Pistol Grip
19. Lower Sling Swivel
20. Butt Plate



M16 Rifle, Left Side View

21. Gas Tube
22. Bolt Catch/Release
23. Safety Selector Lever
24. Takedown Pin
25. Pivot Pin

Figure 2-1. M-16 Rifle, Nomenclature.



Figure 2-2. M-60 Machine Gun.



1. BARREL GROUP
2. TRIGGER MECHANISM GROUP
   A. LEAF SPRING
   B. TRIGGER HOUSING PIN
   C. TRIGGER MECHANISM LOCK ASSEMBLY
3. STOCK GROUP
4. FOREARM ASSEMBLY
5. COVER, TRAY, AND HANGER GROUP
   A. HINGE PIN LATCH
   B. HINGE COVER PIN
   C. SPRING
   D. COVER ASSEMBLY
   E. CARTRIDGE FEED TRAY ASSEMBLY
6. BUFFER AND OPERATING ROD GROUP
   A. BUFFER RETAINING YOKE
   B. BUFFER ASSEMBLY
   C. DRIVING SPRING GUIDE ASSEMBLY
   D. DRIVING SPRING
   E. OPERATING ROD ASSEMBLY
7. BOLT ASSEMBLY
8. RECEIVER

Figure 2-3. M-60 Machine Gun, Major Groups and Assemblies.



Figure 2-4. Caliber .38 Revolver, Nomenclature.



40mm Grenade Launcher, M203, Mounted on M-16 Rifle



Figure 2-5. M-203 40mm Grenade Launcher.

MISSILE SECURITY

SECTION A - MINUTEMAN SECURITY

3-1. BARRIERS AND DEVICES. Security afforded the Minuteman weapon system is unique. Security protection is integrated with the weapon system itself and is provided through a series of physical barriers and mechanical/electronic devices. The information required to circumvent these barriers and devices and gain entry into a Minuteman launcher or onto a launch facility is controlled, rather than the actual entry of the individual. Unauthorized attempted entry results in an armed response by Security Police.

3-2. DISPATCHED PERSONNEL. Personnel requiring dispatch into the missile wing complex are identified to controlling agencies through a series of administrative procedures and appropriate records on file at various agencies. Each team which has the need to enter into the missile wing complex must first be identified by the appropriate controlling agencies and receive the necessary code material for further identification once in the missile wing complex.

3-3. INFORMATION REQUIRED. Information required for physical entry into a launcher or onto a launch facility is withheld until actual arrival at the missile site. Upon positive identification by the flight security controller or missile combat crew, the necessary information is passed to the individuals.

3-4. COMMAND/CONTROL. The missile combat crew commander (MCCC) on duty in the launch control center (LCC) is in command of the flight and is responsible for the safe operation of any missile system controllable from the LCC. The MCCC must exercise direct command/control during any situation, actual or potential, which involves safety of personnel or equipment.

SECTION B - MINUTEMAN ACRONYMS

"A" Circuit	LF security pit vault door lock
ACP	Alternate Command Post
AFT	Airborne Fire Team
"B" Circuit	LF secondary door lock
CAT	Camper Alert Team
DMCC	Deputy Missile Combat Crew Commander
EVCN	Exercise Visitor Control Number
FSC	Flight Security Controller
FSO	Flight Security Officer
FSS	Flight Security Supervisor
IZ	Inner Zone
KCCC	Keys and Codes Control Center
LCC	Launch Control Center
LCEB	Launch Control Equipment Building
LF	Launch Facility
LCF	Launch Control Facility
LEB	Launcher Equipment Building
MCC	Missile Combat Crew
MECS	Minuteman Entry Control System
NDA	National Defense Area
OZ	Outer Zone
PT	Payloader Transporter
RS	Reentry System
RV	Reentry Vehicle
SAM	Security Alert Message
SCC	Security Control Center
SCP	Squadron Command Post
SET	Security Escort Team
SIN	Support Information Network
SMSB	Strategic Missile Support Base
TCC	Transportation Control Center
VCN	Visitor Control Number
WCP	Wing Command Post
WJC	Wing Job Control
WSC	Wing Security Control
TE	Transporter Erector

SECTION C - FREQUENTLY USED FORMS AND DOCUMENTS

3-5. SAC FORM 797, AUTHENTICATOR ASSIGNMENT/ENTRY AUTHORIZATION REQUEST/RECORD. Maintained on file at KCCC. Used by KCCC to:

a. Verify identity of dispatched teams.

b. Verify security clearances.

c. Record MECS authenticator assignment information.

d. Cross-check other forms used in MECS.

3-6. SAC Form 798, APPROVED DISPATCH NOTIFICATION. Used to notify the FSC and MCC of approved dispatches.

3-7. SAC Form 799, PRE-DISPATCH NOTIFICATION. Used to notify KCCC of the requirement for a dispatch.

3-8. SAC FORM 925, CODE CONTROL REGISTER. Used to receipt for and record destruction of issued code tables.

3-9. AF COMSEC FORM 16, COMSEC ACCOUNT DAILY--SHIFT INVENTORY. Used by the FSC to account for all classified material.

3-10. SAC FORM 893, FLIGHT TIME-DISTANCE RESPONSE MATRIX. A matrix which shows mileage and travel times between sites. One is prepared for each flight area.

SECTION D - TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

3-11. UNMANNED LF. An unmanned LF is one which is not occupied by an authorized team.

3-12. MANNED LF. A manned LF is one which is occupied by an authorized team.

3-13. PENETRATED LF. A penetrated LF is one in which the "A" and "B" circuit combinations have been passed but neither is opened.

3-14. UNBUTTONED LF. An unbuttoned LF is one in which the "A" Circuit vault door is unlocked and/or removed and the "B" circuit is opened and lowered.

3-15. COMPROMISE. A classified document is considered compromised when the possibility exists that an unauthorized person had access to it.

3-16. MISSION CATEGORIES. A numerical classification given to each dispatch, which serves as a guide for determining authentication requirements, security status reporting intervals, security escort requirements, and security response priorities.

3-17. LOCAL EXEMPT MISSION. Refers to the wing commander, who is authorized entry to all LCFs/LCCs and manned LFs based on positive personnel recognition only.

3-18. AUTHENTICATOR. A six-digit number used to positively identify all persons granted unescorted entry to LFs/LCCs.

3-19. MINUTEMAN ENTRY CONTROL SYSTEMS (MECS). Designed to control the information necessary for entry to LFs and LCFs.

3-20. SCRAMBLE NUMBER. The number that the "A" circuit dial should be set on after resecuring the "A" circuit in the hole.

3-21. MISSILE FIELD RESPONSE FORCE. Composed of flight ARTs, SRTs, and two or more fire teams.

SECTION E - MINUTEMAN SECURITY JOB DESCRIPTIONS

3-22. FLIGHT SECURITY OFFICER (FSO). A Security Police commissioned officer or senior NCO responsible for the safeguarding of nuclear resources in two squadrons. Reports directly to the Operations Officer.

3-23. FLIGHT SECURITY SUPERVISOR (FSS). A Security Police NCO (normally a TSgt or MSgt) responsible for the safeguarding of nuclear resources and proper conduct of flight operations in a single squadron. Reports directly to the Flight Security Officer.

3-24. FLIGHT SECURITY CONTROLLER (FSC). A Security Police NCO or highly qualified airman responsible for the proper conduct of security operations within a single flight area. Reports directly to the FSS.

3-25. ALARM RESPONSE TEAM (ART). A lightly armed two-man Security Police team dedicated to a single flight area. These teams provide the initial response to security alarm situations within their assigned flight area. ARTs are part of the missile field response force. Members report directly to the FSC.

3-26. SECURITY RESPONSE TEAM (SRT). A lightly armed three-man Security Police team composed of the off-duty FSC and off-duty ART, used to respond to emergencies only. May be a part of the missile field response force.

SECTION F - SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

3-27. FIRE TEAM (FT). A heavily armed four-man Security Police team, either on constant patrol within the missile field or used to escort nuclear weapons in transit.

3-28. CAMPER ALERT TEAM (CAT). A two-man team posted at an LF to compensate for an inoperative site security system.

3-29. SECURITY ESCORT TEAM (SET). A one or two-man team dispatched with a maintenance team to provide surveillance and security over the insecure launcher.

SECTION G - MINUTEMAN SECURITY CHECKLISTS

CHECKLIST NO.	TITLE
4	RESPONSE TO ALARM SITUATIONS 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9c
5	LCF INSPECTION
6	ART/SRT TOPSIDE/SNOW DEPTH CHECK
7	RESPONSE TO DURESS OF A MOBILE ELEMENT
8	RESPONSE TO DURESS OF MOBILE ELEMENT OUTSIDE LCF GATE
9	RESPONSE TO LCF DURESS OR MISAUTHENTICATION
10	RESPONSE TO LF DURESS OR MISAUTHENTICATION
11	RESPONSE TO "A" CIRCUIT LOCKOUT
12	RESPONSE TO A BOMB THREAT AT AN LCF OR LF
13	FSO/FSS LCF COMPLIANCE CHECK
14	LCF SECURITY POLICE CHANGEOVER ACTIONS
15	"A" CIRCUIT OPENING
16	"A" CIRCUIT COMBINATION CHANGE
17	SAFE HAVEN ACTIONS
18	RESPONSE TO AN ELEVATOR SHAFTWAY ALARM
19	OPERATOR CARE CHECK SHEET
20	SCC ALARM PROCEDURES

SECTION H - ALARM SITUATIONS

3-30. ALARM SITUATION 1:

a. ALPHA - Positive or passive duress from a Mission Cat #1 element in the flight area (excluding the L
Checklist (C/L) #7.

b. BRAVO - Alarm from RV/G&C Van or PT containing a nuclear warhead and parked at the LCF: C/L #9 or
#8 if outside LCF gate.

c. CHARLIE - Any serious incident affecting the security of warheads:

(1) RV/G&C Van or PT involved in an accident: C/L #7.

(2) RV/G&C Van or PT breakdown: C/L #8.

(3) RV/G&C Van or PT on fire: C/L #9.

(4) (Lead/Trail)(ORT) security escort vehicle breakdown, RV/G&C Van or PT continuing: C/L #10.

(5) Loss of surveillance helicopter due to unplanned/unforeseen considerations: SACR 207-16.

d. DELTA - Any suspicious incident or activity observed along the convoy route or near the convoy: C/L

3-31. ALARM SITUATION 2:

a. ALPHA - Positive duress at own LCF: C/L #9.

b. BRAVO - Unauthorized/unidentified personnel attempting entry to the LCF: C/L #8.

c. CHARLIE - Any serious incident affecting the security of the LCF: C/L #9.

d. DELTA - LF status out: C/L #4.

3-32. ALARM SITUATION 3:

a. ALPHA - Authorized/unidentified personnel attempting entry or present on an LF: C/L #4.

b. BRAVO - Duress indication from another LCF (may be indicated by a complete loss of communication):
#9.

c. CHARLIE - Positive duress from a Mission Cat 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 element on an LF or in the flight area: C/L #7 if trip under duress is mobile, C/L #8 if trip is at LCF, C/L #10 if trip is at LF.

3-33. ALARM SITUATION 4. Illumination of both inner and outer security warning lights: C/L #4.

3-34. ALARM SITUATION 5:

a. ALPHA - Illumination of not authenticated warning light: C/L #4.

b. BRAVO - LCC elevator shaftway alarm.

3-35. ALARM SITUATION 6. Illumination of the inner security warning light: C/L #4.

3-36. ALARM SITUATION 7. Illumination of the outer security warning light: C/L #4.

3-37. ALARM SITUATION 8:

a. ALPHA - Passive duress from Mission Cat 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 element on an LF or in the flight area: C/L #7 if trip under duress is mobile, C/L #8 if trip is at LCF, C/L #10 if trip is at LF.

b. BRAVO - Incorrect VCN received by the MCC from their FSC: C/L #9.

c. CHARLIE - Misauthentication:

(1) Two misauthentications by "A" side member(s) during initial entry: C/L #10.

(2) A single misauthentication by an "A" side member at an unpenetrated manned LF after initial entry: C/L #10.

(3) Two misauthentications by an "A" side member(s) of a follow-on team attempting to enter a manned unpenetrated LF: C/L #10.

d. DELTA - Misauthentications:

(1) Two misauthentications by a "B" side member(s) during initial entry: C/L #10.

(2) A single misauthentication by a "B" side member(s) at an unpenetrated manned LF after initial entry: C/L #10.

(3) Two misauthentications by a "B" side member(s) of a follow-on team attempting to enter a manned unpenetrated LF: C/L #10.

e. ECHO - Two misauthentications by a missile combat crew member(s) at the LCF: C/L #9.

f. FOXTROT - Two misauthentications by a dispatched team (except MCCCs) to the LCF requesting entry to the LCEB/LCC: C/L #9.

3-38. ALARM SITUATION 9:

a. ALPHA - Any uninvestigated loss of system pressure in the hardened cable serving an LF and a fault warning light with a VRSA channel 33 for which the cause cannot be determined for the same LF: C/L #4.

b. BRAVO - Any uninvestigated loss of pressure in the hardened cable serving an LF and a nonresettable input line lost for the same LF: C/L #4.

c. CHARLIE - Inner and/or outer security lights fail to illuminate during or reset after SCN test (unmanned site): C/L #4.

d. DELTA - Any one or combination of the following items that exist which requires anti-jam operations: C/L #4.

(1) Continuous erratic status.

(2) Net traffic condition (comm fail 9).

WEAPONS STORAGE AREA

SECTION A - WEAPONS STORAGE AREA (WSA)

4-1. SECURITY. The 90th Security Police Squadron is responsible for the security of the WSA. The WSA houses all weapons related to the Minuteman missile system not currently mated to a missile. Also, all warheads and related components are brought in and out of the WSA for minor maintenance and inspection of parts.

4-2. DUTY. Security force members are on duty 24 hours a day protecting our resources on base. The Small Permanent Communications and Display Segments (SPCDS) installed in and around the WSA aid members in the accomplishing of this mission. SPCDS is a multi-million dollar investment which greatly enhances our detection capabilities and affords personnel working in the area a higher level of security.

4-3. SHIFTS. The WSA works a four-flight system with a six-day-on and three-day-off schedule. A flight (day shift) has three elements which rotate, six days working and three days off. B, C, and D flights rotate three swing shifts and three midnight shifts before going on a three-day break. Each flight is responsible for conducting training once a month on a day of break.

4-4. ENTRY CONTROL POINT. Probably the most vulnerable area of the WSA is the entry control point. The exchange badge system is used to control passage through this point. There are four badges used in this system: AF Forms 1199 (blue), 1199A (green), 1199B (pink), and 1199C (yellow), Restricted Area Badge. At present, only the blue and pink restricted area badges are used at Francis E Warren AFB; however, this is subject to change. The number 13 must be open to enter the area. To enhance the system even more, an additional form of identification is required before entry is allowed into the area. Flight chiefs are very selective when choosing personnel to perform as entry controllers. This is one of the most critical posts in the WSA, as there is no room for error.

4-5. THE MASTER SURVEILLANCE CONTROL FACILITY (MSCF). This facility contains all of the SPCDS equipment plus one operator. The operator is a highly trained individual who has devoted many hours to the learning of this complex alarm system. The MSCF operator (MSCFO) is responsible to monitor the equipment, which extends beyond the fence line in the form of a buried MAID MILES cable and which is capable of detecting ferrous metal and pressure. The MSCFO also monitors a fence disturbance sensor (FDS) on the fence line, which is activated by a mercury switch, to detect almost any disturbance of the fence line; and a camera system covering all areas of the WSA not directly visible from the tower.

4-6. RESPONSE FORCE. The response force for the WSA consists of a 15 in 5 deployment. That means 15 armed personnel at any time are capable of responding to any threat in or around the WSA within five minutes. The personnel who compose the 15 in 5 are the area supervisor, ARTs 1 and 2, MPTs 1 and 2, and the SRT, which is primarily an external patrol.

a. When the ART is dispatched to alarm, it has one minute to arrive at the scene from the time that the alarm is received. The MPTs, SRT, and area supervisor all have five minutes.

b. During Security Response Options (SRO) 1 and 2 and convoys within the area, all personnel are required to wear their flak vests and helmets.

c. A plan of succession is needed in cases of emergency or possible power outages when we lose the capability to communicate with our dispatch centers. The plan of succession for the WSA is as follows:

MSCFO to
WSC to
WCP to
T-1 in the missile field.

4-7. NO-LONE ZONES. The no-lone zones in the WSA are located in all "hot" (containing warheads) bays inside building 1152, all hot igloos, and any PT van while unloaded. The WSA also includes outlaw support areas, which are the Entry Control Point and the cab of a hot PT van.

SECTION B - WSA DUTY POSITIONS

4-8. FLIGHT CHIEF. Responsible for the overall security of the WSA.

4-9. AREA SUPERVISOR. Responsible for the total internal security of the WSA.

4-10. ENTRY CONTROLLER. Responsible for ensuring that only authorized personnel and vehicles enter the WSA.

4-11. ALARM MONITOR. Monitors alarm panel and the opening and closing of all structures/bays in the WSA.

4-12. MASTER SURVEILLANCE CONTROL FACILITY OPERATOR (MSCFO). Responsible for monitoring all alarms such as the fence disturbance sensors (FDSs) and MAID/MILES cables around the perimeter and all alarms on buildings and structures within the WSA.

4-13. ALARM RESPONSE TEAM (ART). A two-man security force posted to respond to any situation as directed by the MSCFO and area supervisor.

4-14. SECURITY RESPONSE TEAM (SRT). A two-man team posted outside of the WSA also to take on the ARTs during a response. The SRT will also be used to check all avenues of approach to the WSA.

4-15. ALERT FIRE TEAM (AFT). A heavily armed team has been designated to constitute a fighting force or counterattack force against any enemy forces attempting to penetrate the WSA.

4-16. VEHICLE SEARCHER. Responsible for verifying identity of all persons at the pedestrian gate and searching all escorted persons and vehicles entering the area.

LAW

ENFORCEMENT

SECTION A - LAW ENFORCEMENT FORMS

5-1. COMMONLY USED FORMS. Various forms will be used daily in order for you to perform your law enforcement duties. The proper use of forms is essential and you should remain current on any changes that may occur to ensure they are completed correctly. Below are several forms commonly used and the purpose of each.

a. AF FORM 52, EVIDENCE TAG. Used to confiscate evidence or contraband, receive property from persons, and record found property.

b. AF FORM 75, VISITOR/VEHICLE PASS. Used to identify persons/vehicles who have been granted permission to enter a USAF installation.

c. AF FORM 840, MINOR MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT REPORT. Used to record motor vehicle accidents that fall into the following categories: a POV accident in which all vehicles may be safely driven away from the scene under their own power and in which there are no injuries or fatalities; an accident in which government property/vehicles are involved and in which the damage is under $250; and an accident in which there are no discrepancies between the accounts given to you by the operator(s) and in which all the damage correlates to what has been stated to you.

d. AF FORM 841, ACCIDENT INFORMATION EXCHANGE. Used by vehicle operators involved in a minor motor vehicle accident to exchange information.

e. AF FORM 116R, STATEMENT OF SUSPECT. Used to take a written statement from an individual suspected of being involved in an offense.

f. AF FORM 1169, STATEMENT OF WITNESS. Used to take a written statement from a witness or a complainant. The AF Form 1170 (below) will be used in conjunction with this.

g. AF FORM 1170, CONTINUATION SHEET FOR AF FORM 1168 AND 1169. Used as a continuation page for a written statement. Even if a suspect/witness writes a statement on the AF Form 1168 or 1169 and has no need for a continuation sheet, the AF Form 1170 must still be used because it contains a section in which the individual is sworn to his statement.

h. AF FORM 1176, AUTHORITY TO SEARCH AND SEIZE. Used to search areas/persons where consent cannot be obtained from the person involved.

i. AF FORM 1315, ACCIDENT REPORT. Used to investigate motor vehicle accidents that cannot be investigated on the AF Form 840.

j. AF FORM 1361, PICK UP/RESTRICTION ORDER. Used to inform the Security Police that a particular person is wanted or has had a restriction placed upon him or her (restriction to the confines of Francis E Warren AFB is an example).

k. AF FORM 1364, CONSENT FOR SEARCH AND SEIZURE. Used for search and seizure when the suspect freely gives his or her consent to a search of premises or property under control or on his or her own person. You do not need this form to search incident to apprehension.

l. DD FORM 460, PROVISIONAL PASS. Given to AWOL personnel who have been directed to return to their own unit of assignment when that unit is located on a base other than that at which they are in military custody.

m. DD FORM 629, RECEIPT FOR PRISONER OR DETAINED PERSON. Used to release a prisoner or detained individual to his or her own unit or another unit.

n. DD FORM 1408, ARMED FORCES TRAFFIC TICKET. Used to cite active duty military members for minor traffic violations.

o. DD FORM 1805, VIOLATION NOTICE. Used to cite personnel who are not active duty military members for both traffic and nontraffic offenses (shoplifting, trespassing, and so forth).

p. DD Form 1920, ALCOHOLIC INFLUENCE REPORT. Used to assist in determining if a subject is under the influence. A key item to remember when asking questions on the back of the form is to record the subject's answers exactly as he or she gives them. Do not shorten or paraphrase answers.

SECTION B - INVESTIGATING TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS

5-2. IMMEDIATE ACTIONS. When notified to respond to a motor vehicle accident, you should keep several things in mind. Upon arrival you should position your police vehicle, with emergency lights on, in a manner that will protect the scene, to include personnel and any evidence such as skid marks, broken glass, and so forth. Then make a check to determine if a potential hazard such as a fire exists, and request the approoriate assistance through the LE Desk Sergeant. If there are any injuries, request an ambulance and provide immediate first aid until the ambulance arrives. NEVER try to transport an injured person in your Security Police vehicle. Once the injured have been cared for, you may start your investigation.

5-3. TRIANGULATION. When using triangulation to record the position of the vehicle, remember to use permanent reference points such as telephone poles, traffic signs, and so on, as there will be a record of their location even if they are later removed. Do not use trees, shrubbery, parked vehicles, or other temporary reference.

5-4. INJURY OR FATALITY. Accidents involving fatalities or serious injury must be investigated by a person who has attended the traffic accident investigation course at Lackland AFB, Texas.

SECTION C - RESPONDING TO ALARM ACTIVATIONS

5-5. ARRIVAL AT THE SCENE. A minimum of two patrols are dispatched to alarm activations and you are deployed in the position directed by the LE Desk Sergeant (NW corner, SE corner, and so on). You should not use sirens when responding to an alarm activation unless it is absolutely necessary, as the alarm will warn any adversary of your imminent approach. Emergency lights should be turned off before you are in sight of the affected facility, again so as not to prematurely warn the intruder. Upon arriving at the facility, park your vehicle with the engine block facing the target. If you elect to use your vehicle for cover, deploy to the rear of it. If your vehicle is parked in an area such that it may create a traffic hazard, the emergency lights should be turned back on when you arrive.

5-6. CONTACT. Once all the dispatched patrols have arrived and 360° coverage is secured, the Desk Sergeant attempts to contact the personnel inside. During this time the patrols should be looking for the urusual, such as personnel going into the facility but no one leaving. If the custodian tells the LE Desk Sergeant that all is in order, the custodian is directed to step outside and contact the senior Security Police member. When that is done and the patrol has verified that all is in order, an interior check of the building is conducted by the custodian and the Security Police. A minimum of two Security Police or a dog team should enter with at least one radio to conduct the check. If the LE Desk Sergeant contacts the custodian and learns that a hostile armed individual is still inside, a hostage situation is declared and the patrol remains fast until further help arrives or until they are instructed by a competent authority to back off.

SECTION D - RESPONDING TO ALARM ACTIVATION IN THE 90 SPG ARMORY

5-7. ARRIVAL AT THE SCENE. A minimum of three patrols is dispatched to alarm activations involving the 90 SPG Armory. Patrols respond to the areas directed by the LE Desk Sergeant with engine blocks facing the target. If there is a desk clerk available, he or she takes the portable radio from the desk and approaches via the main stairwell to try to determine if any perpetrator(s) is/are present. If there are armed Security Police present and the On-Scene Commander can determine that they are not involved with the situation, they may be used as back-up. All other nonessentials are cleared from the immediate area but are not allowed to depart until it has been determined that they are not involved.

5-8. CONTACT. Once the outside area has been sealed off, the Desk Sergeant contacts the Armory personnel for their status. If all is in order, the patrolman requests the Armorer to slip his DD Form 2AF, United States Uniformed Services Identification Card, under the issue window. The patrolman then verifies the Armorer's identify by asking for at least four digits of the SSAN. The patrolman then returns the ID Card and slips his or her own DD Form 2AF under the window so the Armorer can verify the patrolman's identity. When both parties are satisfied, the shift commander is given access to the Armory for an interior check. If it is determined that a robbery is in progress, the patrols hold their positions until help arrives. Under no circumstances will personnel armed with automatic weapons be allowed to leave the building.

SECTION E - ANTI-ROBBERY PROCEDURES

5-9. PROCEDURES FOR GATE GUARDS. Once notified to implement anti-robbery procedures, the gate guards will proceed as follows: A guard should be positioned in the outbound lane and another in the inbound lane. If traffic is light, the barrier chains should be utilized both inbound and outbound. If the inbound traffic is heavy, it should be allowed to flow normally since this will cause a natural blockage of the lanes. If the alarm is at the 90 SPG Armory, Base Bank, Credit Union, or the Accounting and Finance Center, the outbound traffic should be stopped. If the alarm is at a facility other than one of the above facilities, the stop-check-pass system should be implemented. If directed by competent authority to allow free passage of the robbery vehicle, the gate guards should clear the traffic lane, take cover, and allow the vehicle to depart unhindered. The guards should obtain a description of the vehicle and its occupants for later use by civil authorities.

SECTION F - AIR FORCE LAW ENFORCEMENT TERMINAL SYSTEM (AFLETS)

5-10. AFLETS. This is one of the most important tools used by law enforcement today. Our terminal is located on the LE Desk for use by the LE Desk Sergeant. The terminal is interfaced with the following agencies: the Wyoming Criminal Justice Information Network (WCJIN), the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), and the National Law Enforcement Teletype Sysem (NLETS). The most common use of the terminal at this installation is to run checks on vehicles and persons involved in minor traffic offenses or crimes; however, the terminal has a multitude of other purposes, such as sending messages to any law enforcement agency in the US or Canada, entering stolen items, and receiving information from other agencies on criminals. The terminal may only be used by a certified operator and information received from the system may not be released except to another law enforcement agency.

SECTION G - CANINE CORPS

5-11. DOG TEAMS. Various types of dog teams are used at Francis E Warren AFB such as patrol teams, narcotic detectors, and explosive detectors. Dog teams can be a tremendous asset to the law enforcement flight. A dog's hearing and sense of smell are far superior to those of human beings, which makes the dog ideal for searches for intruders, drugs, or explosives. It should be remembered that the military working dogs are not pets and should not be fed or petted by anyone other than the assigned handler. Also, you should never make a sudden move toward a handler and his or her dog, even in jest. The dog is trained to protect the handler and will do just that. Handlers should be familiar with cleaning and grooming requirements and know in what situations the dogs may be employed on and off leash.

SECTION H - CONFINEMENT

5-12. DETENTION FACILITIES. Casual, pretrial, adjudged, and sentenced prisoners are confined in the detention facility located next to the Law Enforcement Desk. Anyone performing turnkey duties receives orders and instructions from the NCOIC of Confinement. Prisoners in minimum custody status, installation parolee status, or unit parolee status require no escort when outside the detention facility. Those in medium custody status require one unarmed guard when outside the detention facility, and each maximum custody prisoner outside the detention facility must be accompanied by two unarmed guards. Females are not confined in the detention facility under any circumstances. They instead are confined in Barracks 224, room 100. Only female personnel are used to guard female prisoners. If prisoners cannot be returned to the detention facility due to fire or other damage, they will be escorted to the basement of building 228 until a more suitable location is found (such as the Laramie County Sheriff's Office jail) or until the damage is repaired.

SECTION I - RIGHTS ADVISEMENT

5-13. PROCEDURES. Any time a person is being questioned and you know that the interviewee's answers may be self-incriminating, that person should be advised of his or her rights in accordance with the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution, the US Code (for civilians), and Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) (for military). There are other special circumstances which you need to be aware of. If the questionee is a juvenile, every attempt must be made to have parent(s) or legal guardian(s) of the juvenile present prior to and during any questioning. If the sponsor cannot be contacted and it is imperative that the juvenile be questioned, you may proceed if accompanied by two Security Policemen. If the offense is relatively minor, consider delaying questioning until later that day or the following day. If any person states that he or she desires legal counsel after being advised of his or her rights but still indicates a willingness to answer questions, do not proceed with any questioning until the suspect has had an opportunity to consult with an attorney. If a suspect states a desire for legal counsel but later admits guilt on his or her own initiative, this may be used against the suspect as long as you did not question the suspect or initiate the conversation. This is known as a "spontaneous explanation." The best thing to remember is this: if you are in doubt as to the legality of questioning a suspect, don't until you have consulted the Staff Judge Advocate.

SECTION J - SEARCH AND SEIZURE

NOTE: See figures 5-1 through 5-4, pages 32-37.

5-14. WHEN SECURITY POLICE MEMBERS MAY CONDUCT SEARCHES:

a. When permission has been obtained from competent authority. Competent authority would be the base commander for any area on the installation, a squadron commander for any area within his or her squadron, and so forth.

b. Immediately after completing the lawful apprehension of an individual.

c. When circumstances demand immediate action to prevent the removal or disposal of property believed, on reasonable grounds, to be criminal goods.

d. When a person has consented to search.

5-15. FORCE. Reasonable force may be used to accomplish any lawful search.

5-16. EVIDENCE. All evidence and/or criminal goods obtained as a result of a lawful search may be seized.

SECTION K - CODES

5-17. CODE #1 - ROUTINE: Any call not actually assigned a code is assumed to be code 1. This is a routine call and is to be answered by observing all traffic laws. The red lights and siren are not used on any code 1 call. If the Security Police receiving the call become aware of circumstances unknown to radio control, they may use code 2 or 3 but the responsibility for the decision is strictly their own.

5-18. CODE #2 - URGENT: Code 2 means urgent, and is answered immediately and in a manner that will enable the unit to get to the scene as quickly as possible with safety, by observing all traffic laws and without the use of the siren. Use of red lights is authorized. Caution should be observed, since the use of the red lights alone may not be sufficient to assure the vehicle the right-of-way. Code 2 is also known as a "silent run" and is used when use of a siren might frighten off persons involved in the commission of an offense. In such situations the vehicle operator is advised, depending on traffic conditions, to turn off the red lights when approaching the scene.

5-19. CODE #3 - EMERGENCY: Code 3 means "Emergency" and like code 2 is answered immediately by driving to the scene as quickly and safely as possible, but in this case the red lights and siren are to be used to obtain the "right-of-way." It should be remembered that Code 3 is not a magic phrase that clears all traffic ahead, and that the important thing is to get there. Slow down and check traffic carefully to your right and left before moving through an intersection or making a turn. Be prepared to stop. DO NOT pass a vehicle until you are sure that cars ahead of you understand your intentions.

5-20. CODE #4 - WANTS AND WARRANTS: Code 4 means a unit is either requesting a "wants and warrants" check on either a vehicle or person or that the LE Desk Sergeant is issuing a "wants and warrants" call to a police unit. Units will respond to this call in the same manner as a code 1.

NOTE: If the patrolman changes to a higher code, the desk sergeant must be notified.

OFFICIAL

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

Figure 5-1. Wall Search Positions.



G. H.

Figure 5-1. Wall Search Positions (continued).



A. B. C. D.

Figure 5-2. Handcuffing Procedures.



Figure 5-2. Handcuffing Procedures (continued).

A.

B.



C.

Figure 5-3. Kneeling Search.

Figure 5-4. Ground Search.

Figure 5-4. Ground Search (continued).

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